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PUTTING A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE:
VICTIMS, RETRIBUTION, AND GEORGE
RYAN'S CLEMENCY
AUSTIN SARAT*
On January 11, 2003, Governor George Ryan of Illinois launched
the broadest attack on the death penalty in decades, using his
clemency power to empty his state's death row of 167 condemned
inmates. This Article examines what Ryan's rhetoric and the
justifications behind it reveal about victims' rights, retributive
justice, and legality. It places Ryan's decision in the context of
gubernatorial exercises of clemency in the twentieth century and
shows how, until Ryan, the use of clemency in capital cases had
atrophied. In opposition to many of Ryan's critics, it argues that
Ryan's rhetoric was impelled by democracy's fragile sovereignty
and by a limited view of clemency, one not at all hostile to legality.
Indeed, what Ryan did lends itself easily to positions taken by
conservative politicians and judges who see retributive principles
providing the only legitimate basis for executive clemency in
America's capital punishment system. Yet, in the end, Ryan's
decision is caught in the crossfire of two of our society's most
powerful but opposing forces, the claims of victims and the
demands of retribution, forces that he could neither ignore nor
reconcile.
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[T]hough the victim occupies the unhappy special position of
victim and is owed compensation, he is not owed punishment.
Robert Nozick 1
INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 2003, Governor George Ryan of Illinois emptied
that state's death row by exercising his clemency powers under the
state constitution, first pardoning four and then commuting 167
condemned inmates' sentences in the broadest attack on the death
penalty in decades. 2 Ryan's act was the single sharpest blow to capital
punishment since the United States Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional in 1972.3  It was also a dramatic reminder of the
powers of chief executives at the state and federal level to grant
clemency,4 and of the role of two important forces-the claims of
victims and the demands of retributive justice-in contemporary
American law and politics.
While Ryan did not do what the victims' community wanted him
1. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 138 (1974).
2. On January 11, 2003, Ryan commuted 167 death sentences to life without parole.
Jeff Flock, "Blanket Commutation" Empties Death Row: Incoming Governor Criticizes
Decision, CNN.com (Jan. 13, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/ll/
illinois.death.row (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The previous day he
pardoned four death row inmates. Another three inmates had their sentences shortened
to forty year terms. Robert Anthony Phillips, Ryan Commutes All Death Sentences in
Illinois, The Death House.com (Jan. 11, 2003), at http://www.thedeathhouse.com/
deathhousenewfi_352.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972); see James W. Marquart &
Jonathan R. Sorensen, Institutional and Post-Release Behavior of Furman-Commuted
Inmates in Texas, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 677, 677-93 (1988) (noting that Furman caused the
reduction of approximately 600 death sentences across the nation to life in prison).
4. The Battered Women's Clemency Project at the University of Michigan describes
executive power to grant clemency this way:
Clemency is a general term for the power of an executive to intervene in the
sentencing of a criminal defendant to prevent injustice from occurring. It is a
relief imparted after the justice system has run its course.... The U.S.
Constitution gives the President the power to grant clemency. In 35 states, the
governor can make clemency decisions directly, or exercise this power in
conjunction with an advisory board. In five states, boards make clemency
decisions, and in 16 states, the power to grant clemency is shared between the
governor and an advisory board.
SARAH GERAGHTY, CLEMENCY FOR BATTERED WOMEN IN MICHIGAN: A MANUAL
FOR ATTORNEYS, LAW STUDENTS AND SOCIAL WORKERS 12 (1998) (citations omitted),
http://www.umich.edu/-clemency/clemency-manual/manual-chapter02.html (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
GEORGE RYAN'S CLEMENCY
to do, his justificatory rhetoric paid homage-perhaps undue
homage-to victims. While he broadened and complicated
traditional conceptions of victimhood, he nonetheless used his
clemency decision to identify with and express respect for victims.
Yet he also sought refuge in the principles of retributive justice. This
Article argues that Ryan tried to reconcile the irreconcilable by
combining fidelity to victims and their suffering with adherence to
retribution, and by trying to be responsive to both private pain and
the strict dictates of public justice. His failure to make a square peg
fit in a round hole was symptomatic of the complex and contradictory
pulls of victims' rights and retribution in our legal and political
systems.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when Governor Ryan claimed to feel the
pain of the victims and then seemed to ignore it, he enraged them and
left them feeling like they had suffered another undeserved injury.
Reacting to Ryan's clemency decision, Cathy Drobney, whose
daughter Bridget was murdered in 1985 by one of the people granted
clemency, accused Governor Ryan of gross insensitivity to murder
victims and their families. Referring to the victims whose killers had
their sentences commuted, she said, " '[Governor Ryan] has killed
them all over again.'" John Woodhouse's wife, Kathy Ann, was
raped and murdered in 1992; when he learned of Ryan's decision,
Woodhouse complained that the death penalty debate in Illinois had
become very one-sided because it focused on offenders rather than
the victims and the harm done to their families. 6 Woodhouse said:
The problem is the system, not the sentences .... They had
years and years to fix the flaws in the system. But don't destroy
the sentences. Don't let murderers off the hook. This makes a
mockery of my wife's life.7
Randy Odle, whose cousin murdered five other members of his
family in 1985, also criticized Ryan for acting unjustly.8 He stated,
" 'This decision mocks our judicial system, and tells the jurors they
did not do their jobs.' "I
5. See Associated Press, Illinois Governor's Blanket Pardon Spares Lives of 167
Condemned Inmates, FoxNews.com (Jan. 11, 2003), at http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,75170,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
6. Claire O'Brien, Ryan: Life over Death: Over Protests of Victims' Families,
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Such criticism was not confined to the victim community. Rod
Blagojevich, Ryan's successor, said:
I support [Governor Ryan's] decision on the moratorium....
But I disagree with his decision to provide blanket
clemency.... There is no one-size fits all approach to this.10
Cook County State's Attorney Richard Devine joined the attack on
Ryan, combining the argument about victims with Blagojevich's
complaint about the injustice of the mass clemency. He said:
All of these cases would have been best left for consideration
by the courts which have the experience, the training and the
wisdom to decide innocence or guilt .... By his actions today
the governor has breached faith with the memory of the dead
victims, their families and the people he was elected to serve.11
State Senator William Haine, who, during his tenure as a state's
attorney had helped convict two of those whom Ryan freed from
death row, provided one of the most extensive critiques. 2 He called
Ryan's clemency decision "a great wrong ... [and] an extraordinary
and ... breathtaking act of arrogance."' 3 Pointing in two somewhat
different directions, Haine argued that clemency was meant to be
used "sparingly to prevent clear miscarriages of justice" and "for an
occasional act of mercy."' 4  "George Ryan," he continued, "has
severed the bond of trust between those who hold great power on
behalf of the people and the people themselves." 5
Senator Haine observed:
[Ryan] may have irreparably injured the law itself .... He
has profoundly insulted his subordinates in the system-the
state's attorneys, the police officers, the jurors and judges-
with his pen and his reckless language.'
6
Haine was angered that Ryan used his gubernatorial power to
circumvent the state's legal system:
Even those who are opposed to the death penalty as an option
10. Reactions to Death Row Commutations, CNN.com (Jan. 12, 2003), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/12/deathrow.quotes/ (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
11. Phillips, supra note 2.
12. Steve Whitworth, Haine Enraged by Governor's Move, TELEGRAPH (Alton, Ill.),







must stand shocked at the use of raw power to cut down the law
itself, the Constitution, to get at the end they desire-a state
without a death penalty .... If they cheer him at Northwestern
Law School [where Ryan announced his clemency decision],
they are cheering the raw exercise of power against the law
itself."
While the governor has "unfettered discretion," Haine continued,
The bond between the governor and the citizens is that these
great powers are to be used with constraint consistent with the
law. George Ryan has, by his conduct, breached that ethic,
which is as old as the Republic itself.... Every citizen should
see this as an abuse of power. This was not intended by the
framers of our Constitution.... I can't think of any analogy to
compare it to other than the Civil War, when senators and
military officers abandoned their oaths and took up arms
against the United States. In the history of the Republic, I can't
compare it to anything else, an act of this nature, where
you .... simply take the position that the law doesn't mean
anything.18
Like Haine, other commentators also called Ryan's act anti-
democratic. "Illinois Gov. George Ryan's commutation of the death
sentences of all 167 inmates in Illinois prisons," the columnist George
F. Will wrote, "is another golden moment for liberals that
underscores how many of their successes are tarnished by being
explicitly, even exuberantly, anti-democratic."' 9  Will compared
Ryan's act to the Supreme Court's abortion decision, 0 stating that it
was "a judicial fiat that overturned the evolving consensus on
abortion policy set by 50 state legislatures. '21  Ryan's clemency
decision will be remembered, Will continued, for its "disregard of
democratic values" and "cavalier laceration of the unhealable wounds
of those who mourn the victims of the killers the state of Illinois
condemned.
'22
This Article examines Ryan's clemency announcement,
17. Id.
18. Id. For an assessment and critique of the argument that clemency is a lawless act,
see Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive
Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life 9-22 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
19. George F. Will, Editorial, Unhealable Wounds, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at B7.
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-67 (1978).
21. Will, supra note 19.
22. Id.
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interestingly entitled "I Must Act, 23 for what it says about victims'
rights, retributive justice, and legality. Part I looks in greater depth at
the tension between the principles of retributive justice and the claims
of victims. Part II places Ryan's decision in the context of
gubernatorial exercises of clemency in the twentieth century and
shows how the use of clemency in capital cases has atrophied. Part III
looks in detail at "I Must Act" for what it reveals about the
justifications for Ryan's clemency decision, and argues that Ryan's
rhetoric is impelled by democracy's fragile sovereignty and a limited
view of clemency. This view is not at all hostile to legality; quite to
the contrary, it lends itself easily to positions taken by conservative
politicians and judges who see retributive principles providing the
only legitimate basis for executive clemency in America's capital
punishment system. The Article concludes with the suggestion that
Ryan's decision was caught in the crossfire of two of our society's
most powerful opposing forces-the claims of victims and the
demands of retribution-forces that he could neither ignore nor
reconcile.
I. RETRIBUTION AND THE CLAIMS OF VICTIMS
Modern legality is founded on an effort to make reason triumph
over emotion 24 and to make punishments proportional in their
severity to the crimes that occasion them. 25  Just deserts, not
deterrence or rehabilitation, becomes the primary, if not the sole,
norm governing punishment.26 Immanuel Kant noted:
Only the Law of retribution (ius talionis) can determine exactly
the kind and degree of punishment; it must be well understood,
however, that this determination [must be made] in the
chambers of a court of justice (and not in your private
judgment). All other standards fluctuate back and forth and,
23. Governor George Ryan, "I Must Act," Speech at Northwestern University School
of Law (Jan. 11, 2003), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=13&did=551 (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
24. See Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 7 (Susan A.
Bandes ed., 1999).
25. See SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 295 (1983).
26. See id. at 115 ("Insofar as humanly possible ... law attempts to remove personal
animus from the process of apportioning blame and exacting retribution. It is the removal
of private animus ... that distinguishes the rule of law from the rule of passion."). See
generally RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND
DESERT 11-25 (1979) (discussing and evaluating deserts approaches); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE




because extraneous considerations are mixed with them, they
cannot be compatible with the principle of pure and strict legal
justice.27
Kant's suggestion that the determination of punishment must not
be made in private judgments relegates the claims of victims to the
margins of a just legal order. Yet, as Terry Aladjem observes, there is
a tension built into the logic of retribution in the liberal state:
[T]he state is supposed to arise from the inclinations of
individuals as they might be found in nature, but it must rescue
them from the very same inclinations.... [A] vengeful "natural
man" turns to the state as a place of appeal from the injustices
of nature and from the excesses of his own revenge.21
This tension is illustrated in Robert Nozick's discussion of the
demands of retributive justice. 29 Nozick identifies five attributes of
retribution and five ways that it distances itself from the claims of
private victims. First, retribution is only provided where there is a
"wrong," while, on the other hand, the punishment that victims may
seek is "for an injury or harm or slight and need not be for a wrong."30
What counts in the realm of injury, harm, or slight is the private pain
of the victim and not the intent of the person whose action caused
that pain.
While "retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of
punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong," victims often
recognize no such limits.31 Nozick means that retributive punishment
must be proportional to the wrong committed.32 In addition, "the
27. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138-39 (John Ladd
trans., Hackett 2d ed. 1999) (1797).
28. Terry Aladjem, Revenge and Consent: The Death Penalty and Lockean
Principles of Democracy 9, 16 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
29. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981); see also JOEL
FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95-
118 (1970) (discussing the expressive, symbolic function of punishment); Hugo Adam
Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601, 601 (1978) (noting
confusion in the scope, limitations, explanations, and justifications of retributive theory);
John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 240-41 (1979) (recognizing
tension between traditional retributive theory and the more contemporary retributive
notion that no one should be punished unless guilty and culpable).
30. NOZICK, supra note 29, at 366.
31. Id. at 367.
32. See Michael Davis, Harm and Retribution, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 236, 238-39
(Summer 1986), reprinted in PUNISHMENT 188, 190-91 (John Simmons et al. eds., 1995)
(describing lex talionis as a principle that requires punishment to be proportional to the
harm done). Kant describes the law of retribution thus: "[A]ny undeserved evil that you
20041 1351
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agent of retribution," Nozick tells us, "need have no special or
personal tie to the victim."33  It is, of course, just this element of
impersonality in retributive justice that causes discomfort and
concern in the victims' rights movement. The goal of victims and
those who take up their cause is to re-personalize criminal justice so
that the sentencer has to declare an alliance-with either the victim or
the offender. Criminal sentencing thus becomes a test of loyalty.
As Nozick sees it, retributive justice involves no "emotional
tone."34  The desire to experience a direct, immediate, passionate
connection to the suffering of the criminal fuels the victims' rights
movement. Only when victims become agents in the suffering of the
people responsible for their own suffering is a kind of social
equilibrium reached. "The notion of paying back," Miller argues,
"makes no sense unless the victim or his representative is there to hit
back. Under this paradigm ... [t]he focus is ... [o]n the obligation to
repay the wrong done to him by retaliating against either the
wrongdoer or someone closely connected to him."35  When
punishment is guided by retributive principles, the victim's right/need
to pay back remains unsatisfied.
Finally, retribution is based on "general principles ... mandating
punishment in other similar circumstances."36 Victims, in contrast,
care most about their injuries and the punishment inflicted for them.37
Victims and their pain must be kept at bay, so the argument goes,
because they threaten to overwhelm us with anger and passion that
knows no limits. 38 As Saint Augustine put it:
[W]e do not wish to have the sufferings of the servants of God
avenged by the infliction of precisely similar injuries in the way
of retaliation .... [O]ur desire is that justice be satisfied ....
[W]ho does not see that when a restraint is put upon the
boldness of savage violence, and the remedies fitted to produce
repentance are not withdrawn, this discipline should be called a
inflict on someone else among the people is one that you do to yourself." KANT, supra
note 27, at 138.
33. NOzICK, supra note 29, at 367.
34. Id.
35. William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture's Theory of
Revenge, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 161, 167 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1998).
36. Id.
37. NOZICK, supra note 29, at 368.
38. For a discussion of the role of emotion in justice, see generally Samuel Pillsbury,




benefit rather than vindictive punishment?3 9
Justice becomes public and the voice of the victim is merged with
the distanced state bureaucracy which speaks for "The People"
against whom all criminal offenses are said to be directed.4" Beccaria
states:
It is sometimes the custom to release a man from the
punishment of a slight crime when the injured pardons him: an
act, indeed, which is in accordance with mercy and humanity
but contrary to public policy; as if a private citizen could by his
remission do away with the necessity of the example in the
same way that he can excuse the reparation due for an offense.
The right of punishing does not rest with an individual, but with
the community as a whole, or the sovereign. Sometimes a man
is freed from punishment for a lesser crime when the offended
party chooses to forgive-an act in accord with beneficence and
humanity, but contrary to the public good-as if a private
citizen, by an act of remission, could eliminate the need for an
example, in the same way that he can waive compensation for
the injury. The right to inflict punishment is a right not of an
individual, but of all citizens, or of their sovereign.41
Some theorists believe that clemency itself can and should be
governed by retributive principles. The most extended example of
this argument has been offered by Kathleen Moore.4 2 Moore begins
from the proposition that clemency as it is currently understood is an
archaic idea that needs to be refurbished to fit with constitutional
democracy in the modern state.43 She insists on the necessity of
stripping away "all the concepts left over from the seventeenth
century-all the 'acts of grace' and divine forgiveness-and look[ing]
at pardons operatively.... "I' When we do so, she contends, what she
calls the "close relation[ship]" of pardons and punishment will be
apparent.45
39. Saint Augustine, Letter CXXXIII (412 A.D.) (J.G. Cunningham trans., 1872), in 1
A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH 470, 470 (Philip Schaff ed., 1907).
40. Lawrence Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 262, 267-70 (1974).
41. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 58 (Henry Paolucci trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill ed., 1963) (1764).
42. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 89-98 (1989).
43. Id. at 91.
44. Id.
45. Id. Linda Meyer provides a very different perspective on this issue as well as an
2004] 1353
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When looked at operationally, Moore argues, executives may not
have the direct right to assign punishments, but their uses or refusals
to use clemency are punitive.46 They determine "who will be
punished and who will not, and how much and how little."47 If we
grant the equivalence between pardon and punishment, Moore notes,
we will accept that pardons, like punishment, need to be "justified by
reasons having to do with what is just."48 While Moore concedes that
pardons sometimes "make exceptions to rules.., when.., general
presumptions are defeated by exceptional circumstances,"49 she insists
they can and should be disciplined. "[I]n the American democracy,"
Moore argues, "the pardon is not a gift from the sovereign and cannot
be exempt, on that ground, from the need for justification. '" 5° In her
view, the simplest and best justification for punishment is that it is
deserved." While there are other justifications, none is as powerful as
retribution.
A retributive theory of pardons not only has conceptual
advantages, but, in her view, it would have the added benefit of
bringing clemency into line with this era's prevailing theory of
punishment. Even more importantly, it holds out the hope of
bringing clemency to heel, of guiding and governing it in a way that
allows courts and citizens to hold those who have the power to spare
life accountable against a set of coherent standards.
Moore is a strict retributivist in the sense that she believes that
helping to satisfy the demands of just desert is the only basis on which
modern clemency can be justified.52 As she says, "the only good and
sufficient reason for pardoning a felon is that justice is better served
by pardoning than by punishing in that particular case."53 Pardons
are corrective for legal mistakes that put the commands of justice at
risk. They help the law adhere, more closely than it otherwise could,
to those commands.
important critique of retributivism when she contends that every act of punishment is also
"a form of forgiveness." See Linda Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1515,1530 (2000).
46. MOORE, supra note 42, at 91.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 129.
50. Id. at 91.
51. Id. at 92.
52. This is an example of what Dan Markel calls "the confrontational conception of
retribution." See Dan Markel, Against Mercy 26 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
53. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 281, 281 (1993).
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Whether as a theory of punishment or pardon, the victims' rights
movement contests the hegemony of the very normative constraints
that retributive justice insists must govern criminal justice 4 as well as
what Allen calls "the near-total erasure of the victim from the process
of punishment. '55 It demands that the legal system respond to crime
victims' grief and rage 6.5  By turning punishment into a site for the
rituals of grieving,57 that movement would make private experiences
part of public discourse. Yet in so doing, not only is a private
colonization of public processes encouraged; public scrutiny invades
some of most personal aspects of our lives-the ways we suffer and
grieve. The victims' rights movement points to the difficulty of
"reconciling grief and rage and vengefulness with practicable moral
enforcements of civil association... [and] of reconciling a cultural
preoccupation with vengeance and.., forms of legal punishment
which deny it."58 Retributive norms, so this argument goes, no longer
adequately express common moral commitments, if they ever did at
all.
II. THE RECENT HISTORY OF CLEMENCY IN CAPITAL CASES
Governor Ryan acted against this complex backdrop in trying to
heed the voices of victims and, at the same time, satisfy the
requirements of retributive justice. He acted at a time when
clemency in capital cases had come to be both one of the most
dramatic, and least often used, sovereign prerogatives. During the
54. On the requirements of retributive justice, see KANT, supra note 27, at 137-44; see
also MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND
LITERATURE 32-38 (1990) (evaluating the extent to which retributivistic tendencies in
humans are a product of evolutionary biology); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION,
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 77-82 (1979) (discussing
various theories of retributivism and their flaws).
55. Danielle Allen, Democratic Dis-ease: Of Anger and the Troubling Nature of
Punishment, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 24, at 191, 204.
56. See WENDY KAMINER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE: CRIME AND CULTURE 75 (1995)
(noting that we should consider a victim's experiences when "designing a trial process and
resolving individual cases"). "To a victim," Kaminer writes, "the notion that crimes are
committed against society, making the community the injured party, can seem both bizarre
and insulting: it can make them feel invisible, unavenged, and unprotected." Id. See
generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (addressing introduction of victim
impact evidence); Angela Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 S. CT. REV. 77
(analyzing the Supreme Court's holding in Payne that evidence about a victim and the
grief suffered by the victim's family is relevant in the sentencing of a convicted murderer).
57. For a discussion of the rituals of grieving, see generally LOU TAYLOR,
MOURNING DRESS: A COSTUME AND SOCIAL HISTORY (1983).
58. Terry Aladjem, Vengeance & Democratic Justice: American Culture and the
Limits of Punishment 3 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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twentieth century, a few governors took a broad view of this power,
and some used it to overturn large numbers of death sentences.
Unlike Ryan, they neither catered to victims nor, in the exercise of
their clemency power, saw themselves as limited to retributive
considerations.
Terry Sanford, former Governor of North Carolina, is an
example of a governor who took this broad view. He said:
The courts of our state and nation exercise in the name of the
people the powers of administration of justice. The Executive
is charged with the exercise in the name of the people of an...
important attitude of a healthy society-that of mercy beyond
the strict framework of the law.
The use of executive clemency is not a criticism of the courts,
either express or implied. I have no criticism of any court or
any judge. Executive clemency does not involve the changing
of any judicial determination. It does not eliminate
punishment; it does consider rehabilitation.... It falls to the
Governor to blend mercy with justice, as best he can, involving
human as well as legal considerations, in the light of all
circumstances after the passage of time, but before justice is
allowed to overrun mercy in the name of the power of the state.
I fully realize that reasonable men hold strong feelings on
both sides of every case where executive clemency is indicated.
I accepted the responsibility of being Governor, however, and I
will not shy away from the responsibility of exercising the
power of executive clemency. 9
Lee Cruce, Oklahoma governor from 1911 to 1915, commuted
twenty-two death sentences to life in prison, boldly telling the state
legislature that "the infliction of the death penalty by the state is
wrong in morals and is destructive of the highest and noblest ideals in
government."'6  Speaking in the lofty terms of a confident
sovereignty, Cruce asserted his right to spare lives because he
disagreed with the state's policy.61
During Pat Brown's tenure as governor of California, from 1959
to 1966, he anguished over the death penalty and clemency,
59. Governor Terry Sanford, On Executive Clemency (July 4, 1961), in MESSAGES,
ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF TERRY SANFORD, GOVERNOR OF NORTH
CAROLINA, 1961-1965, at 552, 552 (Memory F. Mitchell ed., 1966).
60. Craig Hines, A Heartening Rain As We Await the Flood, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan.




commuting the sentences of twenty-three death row inmates and
allowing thirty-six others to be executed in the gas chamber at San
Quentin.62 Brown later said that his power of life and death
was an awesome, ultimate power over the lives of others that no
person or government should have, or crave. And looking back
over their names and files now, despite the horrible crimes and
the catalog of human weaknesses they comprise, I realize that
each decision took something out of me that nothing-not
family or work or hope for the future-has ever been able to
replace.63
As he cleared Arkansas's death row with commutations at the
end of his term in 1970, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller, like
Governors Sanford, Cruce, and Brown, used the rhetoric of high
moralism to explain his grant of clemency: "I yearn to see other chief
executives throughout the nation follow suit, so that as a people we
may hasten the elimination of barbarism as a tool of American
justice."' In 1986, Governor Toney Anaya of New Mexico, with just
weeks left in office, commuted the death sentences of all five
condemned men in his state.65 He called capital punishment "a false
god that all too many worship." 66 Anaya said that he exercised his
clemency power because he "opposed capital punishment as being
inhumane, immoral, anti-God and incompatible with an enlightened
society. '67 At the time of his commutation decision he had a hopeful
vision: "I am dropping a pebble into a pond that will cause a ripple
which I pray will be joined in other ponds across this great country,
ripples that, coming together, will cause a rising tide.
6
Despite Anaya's prayer, the tide moved in precisely the opposite
direction, with governors increasingly reluctant to grant clemency in
capital cases. Across the nation, the long-held constitutional right of
62. Susan Sward, Pat Brown's Book Helped Ryan Decide: Former Governor Wrote
About Struggles over Death Penalty, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2003, at All.
63. Mary Meehan, Book Review, HARMONY, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 9, 10 (reviewing
EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN WITH DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A
GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH Row (1989)), available at http://members.verizon.
net/-meehan4/mercy.html.
64. Hines, supra note 60.
65. Five, Lives Spared, Hail Anaya's Move, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1986, at A18.
66. Id.
67. Toney Anaya, Statement by Toney Anaya on Capital Punishment, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 177, 177 (1993).
68. Hines, supra note 60. Ohio Governor Richard Celeste commuted the death
sentences of eight inmates days before he left office in January 1991. Ray Long & Steve
Mills, Ryan to Review Death Row Cases: Governor May Commute Terms, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 3, 2002, at 1, 15.
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chief executives to bestow mercy has "died its own death, the victim
of a political lethal injection and a public that overwhelmingly
supports the death penalty."6 9  Thus, at the outset of his
administration, then-Texas Governor Bush embraced a standard for
clemency that all but ensured that few if any death sentences would
be seriously examined. Writing about Bush's views, Alan Berlow
noted,
"In every case," [Bush] wrote in A Charge to Keep, "I would
ask: Is there any doubt about this individual's guilt or
innocence? And, have the courts had ample opportunity to
review all the legal issues in this case?" This is an
extraordinarily narrow notion of clemency review: it seems to
leave little, if any, room to consider mental illness or
incompetence, childhood physical or sexual abuse, remorse,
rehabilitation, racial discrimination in jury selection, the
competence of the legal defense, or disparities in sentences
between co-defendants or among defendants convicted of
similar crimes.... Neither compassion nor "mercy," which the
Supreme Court as far back as 1855 saw as central to the very
idea of clemency, is acknowledged as being of any account.7"
Similarly, then-Governor William Clinton explained his reluctance to
grant clemency by stating that "[t]he appeals process, although
lengthy, provides many opportunities for the courts to review
sentences and that's where these decisions should be made."'"
The Bush and Clinton views were, and are, still very much the
norm. Thus, as death sentences and executions have increased, grants
of clemency have declined. Illustratively, before 1984 the national
ratio of clemency grants to executions was 105 to 32, but in the years
following 1984 the number of executions has increased to seven times
the number of grants of clemency.
During the 1990s, from one to three death row inmates were
granted clemency every year in the entire nation, out of
69. Robert Salladay, Clemency: Slim Chance These Days; Granting Mercy to
Condemned Felons a Vanishing Practice Due to Pressure of Public Sentiment, S.F.
EXAMINER, Nov. 29, 1998, at Al.
70. Alan Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July-Aug.
2003, at 91, 93-94 (quoting GEORGE W. BUSH, A CHARGE TO KEEP 141 (1999)). One
hundred fifty men and two women were executed during then-Governor Bush's six years
as governor. Id. at 91. Clemency was denied in every case but one. Id. No governor in
modern American history has matched this record. Id.
71. Clemency Becoming Rare as Executions Increase, CORRECTIONs DIG., July 8,
1987, at 2.
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approximately sixty to eighty executions each year.72  This is a
dramatic shift from several decades ago, when governors granted
clemency in twenty to twenty-five percent of the death penalty cases
they reviewed.73 In Florida, one of the pillars of the "death belt,"
governors commuted twenty-three percent of death sentences
between 1924 and 1966, yet no Florida death penalty sentences were
commuted in the 1990s."4
Unlike Governors Sanford, Cruce, Brown, Rockefeller and
Anaya, governors today are reluctant to substitute their judgment for
those of state legislators and courts, and to use clemency as a tool of
sovereign prerogative.75 Rejecting appeals from the Pope, Mother
Teresa, televangelist Pat Robertson, former prosecutors, and even
judges and jurors in death cases, they reserve their clemency power
for "unusual" cases in which someone has clearly been unfairly
72. Of the sixty-nine people sentenced to death in 1998, only one was granted
clemency-a Texas man who "confessed" to 600 murders, but was found to be in Florida
during the one killing for which he received a death sentence. See Jim Yardley, On the
Record: Bush and the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at Al (discussing Henry
Lee Lucas and his false confessions); Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the
U.S. in 1998, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=474 (last visited
Apr. 9, 2004) (listing the sixty-eight people who were executed in 1998) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
73. Robert Salladay, supra note 69. In general, it seems that governors now commute
death sentences less frequently than their predecessors. Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples,
The Role of Executive Clemency in Modern Death Penalty Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 227,
227 (1993) (arguing that the recent decline in commutation may be due to "public officials'
inability to place commutation in a context that is intelligible to the public").
74. See Margaret Vandiver, The Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency in Florida
Death Penalty Cases, 1924-1966, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 315, 322 (1993) (cataloguing
Florida's clemency record). See generally Michael Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik,
Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1993)
(cataloguing clemency in the United States from 1972 to 1993).
75. See Beau Breslin & John J.P. Howley, Defending the Politics of Clemency, 81 OR.
L. REV. 231, 239 (2002) ("The use of clemency has declined precipitously in the last
twenty-five years to the point where only a small fraction of those facing execution are
now released from death row."); Alyson Dinsmore, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need
to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1825, 1842 (2002) (indicating that
modern governors view clemency as essentially another appeal and noting the deference
of governors to the courts); Daniel Kobil, Chance and the Constitution in Capital Clemency
Cases, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 567, 572 (2002) (documenting a dramatic drop in the frequency
of commutation after the death penalty was reinstated). There has been a similar decline
at the federal level. See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in
the Theory and Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 125, 126 (2000-2001).
Between 1960 and 1980, pardon applicants had a thirty percent chance of success. Id. By
2000, however, the likelihood of successful applications had dropped to three percent. Id.
Rita Radostitz, co-director of the Capital Punishment Clinic at the University of Texas
and an attorney for Henry Lee Lucas, who was granted clemency in Texas, says about
clemency, "I think that clearly a miscarriage of justice should be raised, but in other cases,
mercy could also come into play." Salladay, supra note 69.
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convicted.76 To some extent this is because of the political climate
surrounding the death penalty. While during the 1950s and 1960s
about fifty percent of the public supported the death penalty, current
polls show the public overwhelmingly approves of it.77 As a result,
many politicians have used the death penalty in their campaigns,
promising more and quicker executions.78 This is "the answer to the
public's fear of crime," Richard Dieter, executive director of the
Death Penalty Information Center, observes, "so (clemency) just goes
against the grain."7 9
III. "I MUST ACT"
Ryan's clemency decision was at once unusual in its scope and
yet quite continuous with the emerging logic governing executive
clemency. He neither linked clemency to mercy nor did he elevate it
to the moral stature of Stanford, Cruce, Brown, or Anaya. His
76. See Howard Mintz, Schwarzenegger Denies Clemency Appeal from Death Row
Inmate: Kevin Cooper Faces Feb. 10 Execution for Murdering Four in 1983, MERCURY
NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), Jan. 30, 2004, at 1A; Clemency Decision Due Monday for Woman
on Texas Death Row: Lethal Injection Set for Tuesday, CNN.com (Feb. 1, 1998), at
http://www.cnn.comUS/9802/01/female.execution/ (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); International Appeals to Spare Tucker Fail, CNN.com (Feb. 3, 1998), at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9802/03/tucker.world/ (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Virginia Inmate Executed Despite International Campaign: Appeals from Pope,
Mother Teresa Fail to Save Him, CNN.com (July 23, 1997), at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9707/23/o.dell/ (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Michael Kroll, The System Screwed Up: Just Because California's Next "Dead Man
Walking" Might Be Innocent Doesn't Mean That His Life Will Be Saved (July 23, 1997), at
http://archive.salon.com/july97/news/news970723.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
77. Samuel Gross & Phoebe Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans' Views of the
Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH
PENALTY 7, 13 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
78. See Jonathan Simon, CAPITAL Punishment: The Death Penalty and Modern
Governance, in Governing Through Crime: The War on Crime and the Transformation of
American Governance 1960-2000, at 5-1, 5-13 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
79. Salladay, supra note 69. Concern regarding the impact of public opinion and
political approval on an executive's choice to exercise the pardon power is not limited to
modern history. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 1497
(3d ed. 1858). Justice Story wrote:
If the power should ever be abused, it would be far less likely to occur in
opposition than in obedience to the will of the people. The danger is not, that in
republics the victims of the law will too often escape punishment by a pardon;
but that the power will not be sufficiently exerted in cases where public feeling
accompanies the prosecution and assigns the ultimate doom to persons who have
been convicted upon slender testimony or popular suspicions.
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critique of capital punishment was systemic, not moral; yet he treated
executive clemency as little more than an adjunct and corrective to
the judicial process. Moreover, because clemency declarations have
no standard genre, George Ryan had to stitch together a rhetorical
performance. 8° He did so by borrowing from the rhetoric of judicial
opinions.8 As though he were a judge who was unelected and
accountable only through the adequacy of his justifications, Ryan
granted clemency as he was about to leave office, no longer subject to
electoral accountability, with the imagined judgment of history as his
target audience.
As a rhetorical performance, Ryan's "I Must Act" was marked
by a certain conceptual incoherence, drawing its logic from the
contradictory claims of victims' rights and retributive justice.82 In
both of these elements Ryan put himself at the center. On the one
hand, he sought to authenticate his act by identifying himself as a
suffering subject, able in his suffering to know the pain that families
of murder victims suffer at the hands of criminals and that they would
suffer at his hands. On the other hand, he painted himself as a
80. The following discussion is derived from Sarat & Hussain, supra note 18, at 39-57.
81. His statement most closely resembles the justificatory act of a judge speaking
through his opinion to the counter-majoritarian difficulty that in a democracy places
judicial review, like executive clemency, in a structurally anomalous position. See Robert
Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN., 201, 202
(1990) (citing the unique nature of the judicial opinion in American political life and
arguing that an important function of judicial language is to "match experience and form
in ways that a citizenry can recognize and accept"). Ferguson describes the rhetoric of
judicial opinions as a response to "the judiciary's non-majoritarian status in a democratic
republic." Id. at 207. Like a judge, Ryan presented his decision as "compelled," an act of
duty, not a personal choice. See id. at 207-08 (noting that the "vital strategy" of judges is
to explain their decisions as neutral in an effort to garner public acceptance and support).
It was, as Ferguson says of judicial rhetoric, "self-dramatizing." Id. at 205. It subsumed
"difference in an act of explanation and moment of decision" and appeared, like a judicial
opinion, "as if forced to its inevitable conclusion by the logic of the situation and the
duties of office, which together eliminate all thought of an unfettered hand." Id. at 205,
207.
82. For a description of the retributive theory of clemency, see MOORE, supra note
42, at 89-98, and Moore, supra note 53, at 286-87. Pardons, like punishment, Moore
argues, need to be "justified by reasons having to do with what is just." MOORE, supra
note 42, at 91. Specifically, Moore argues, pardons are justified when used to correct the
punishment of the innocent (those who stand convicted of a crime they did not commit)
and of those who are guilty under the law but are not morally blameworthy. Moore, supra
note 53, at 286-87. Moreover, they are justified when the punishment of a guilty and
deserving offender is unduly severe or to prevent cruelty or relieve those whose suffering
exceeds what they merit. Id. at 284. In our legal system, the pardon is "a backup system
that works outside the rules to correct mistakes, making sure that only those who deserve
punishment are punished." Id. at 284. For additional discussion regarding the
justifications for clemency, see generally Daniel Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:
Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991).
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reluctant actor seeking to ensure justice in a failing justice system and
a paralyzed political system.
In his story of victims and their suffering, he displayed the frail
sovereignty of a democracy, desperately seeking grounding in a
shared conception of citizenship. In this worldview, what binds us
together is our common suffering and victimization. 3 In his story of
institutional failure, he portrayed himself as a committed
retributivist 4 and embraced a "fail safe" attitude toward clemency
advocated by Clinton, Bush and Justice Rehnquist.' If
responsiveness to victims provided the point of departure for his
clemency, retributive principles provided its disciplining core.
A. Listening to Victims
Legal systems in the United States and Europe have recently
been confronted by stern challenges in the name of victims' rights.86
A tide of resentment is rising against a system of justice which
traditionally has tried to substitute public processes for private action,
and thus to justify the criminal sanction as a response to injuries to
public order rather than harms to particular individuals.87  The
tendency of criminal justice systems in western democracies has been
to displace the victim, to shut the door on those with the greatest
interest in seeing justice done. In response, victims have successfully
83. See generally Jennifer L. Culbert, The Sacred Name of Pain: The Role of Victim
Impact Evidence in Death Penalty Sentencing Decisions, in PAIN, DEATH, AND THE LAW
103, 104 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001) (discussing society's collective identification with an
individual victim's suffering).
84. See Daniel Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 219, 227 (2003) (claiming that Governor Ryan relied entirely on retributive
arguments). This statement is somewhat inaccurate. See infra notes 128-32 and
accompanying text.
85. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Herrera, observed: "Clemency
is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for
preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted." Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 412-13 (1993).
86. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS'
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 177-206 (1995) (discussing the victim's role at trial and
reforms supported by the victims' rights movement); David Roland, Progress in the Victim
Reform Movement. No Longer the 'Forgotten Victim,' 17 PEPP. L. REV. 35, 35-36 (1989)
(documenting the increased public awareness of crime victims' problems in the early
1980s); Stuart Scheingold et al., Sexual Violence, Victim Advocacy, and Republican
Criminology: Washington State's Community Protection Act, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 729,
741-48 (1994) (discussing the role of victim advocacy and victim advocates in the political
process). For a general discussion of the role of the victim in the criminal process, see
Lois FORER, CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS 28-45 (1980).
87. Stephen Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; The Trouble with Us, 105 YALE L.J.
825, 825 (1995) (reviewing FLETCHER, supra note 86).
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demanded that their voices be heard throughout the criminal
process.88
The victims' rights movement wants more. It seeks participation
and power by making the victim the symbolic heart of modern
legality.89 It contests the attempted appropriation of the role of the
victim by offenders and what it sees as the promiscuous use of the
language of victimization throughout our culture. 90 The movement
draws on standard stories and mobilizes around incidents that are
"horrifying and aberrational, 91 generating sentimental narratives of
lives lost, families ruined, and evil done.
Former Attorney General Janet Reno once said:
I draw most of my strength from victims, for they represent
America to me: people who will not be put down, people
who will not be defeated, people who will rise again and
stand again for what is right.... [Y]ou are my heroes and
heroines. You are but little lower than the angels. 2
So important is the image of the victim in our political life that one
scholar argues that crime victims have come to be
the most idealized form of political subjectivity.... It is as
crime victims that Americans are most readily imagined as
88. In 1981, President Reagan proclaimed the week of April 19th the first "National
Victims' Rights Week." Proclamation No. 4831, 3 C.F.R. 18 (1981). The President has
since proclaimed a Crime Victims Week annually. Legislation now exists that grants
victims a role in the plea bargaining process and sentencing decisions as well as a right to
be notified about the release of the offenders who victimized them. See Leroy Lamborn,
Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: The Proposal for a Constitutional
Amendment, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 125, 147-52 (1987). Moreover, "the constitutions of at
least 20 states now contain 'victim's rights amendments,' and similar legislation has been
introduced at the federal level." Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of
the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 144 n.4
(1999). See generally Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1984) (tracing the beginnings of the
victims' rights movement and advocating for further progress); Lynne N. Henderson, The
Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985) (outlining current victims' rights
legislation and examining the confusion and ideology surrounding the movement);
Maureen McLoed, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501 (1986)
(describing various models of victim participation in sentencing proceedings).
89. See Schulhofer, supra note 87, at 825-26, 840-41.
90. See, e.g., Lynn Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937,
943-53 (1985) (describing the growing visibility of the victim in criminal sentencing
decisions); Victim Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1995, at 9, 9 (deploring the public
display of victims' anguish at post-conviction hearings in a Long Island murder trial).
91. Scheingold et. al., supra note 86, at 734.
92. Bruce Shapiro, Victims and Vengeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment is a
Bad Idea, NATION, Feb. 10, 1997, at 11 (quoting Attorney General Janet Reno's
unpublished address to a victims' rights conference on August 12, 1996).
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united by threat that simultaneously downplays their
differences and authorizes them to take dramatic political
steps.... The innocent victim of violent crime becomes the
paradigm example of the citizen who needs government.93
That Ryan's mass commutation was situated in the saga of an
increasingly victim-centered political and legal environment was
suggested by the great prominence that he gave to the language of
victimization in his speech.94 "I have read, listened to and discussed
the issue with the families of the victims as well as the families of the
condemned," Ryan said, before sharing a story in which he identified
himself as a crime victim twice removed.9" "I grew up in Kankakee
which even today is still a small Midwestern town, a place where
people tend to know each other." Ryan continued:
Steve Small was a neighbor. I watched him grow up. He would
babysit my young children which was not for the faint of heart
since Lura Lynn and I had six children, 5 of them under the age
of 3. He was a bright young man who helped run the family
business. He got married and he and his wife had three
children of their own. Lura Lynn was especially close to him
and his family. We took comfort in knowing he was there for us
and we for him. One September midnight he received a call at
his home. There had been a break-in at the nearby house he
was renovating. But as he left his house, he was seized at
gunpoint by kidnappers. His captors buried him alive in a
shallow hole. He suffocated to death before police could find
him. His killer led investigators to where Steve's body was
buried. The killer, Danny Edwards was also from my
93. Jonathan Simon, We the Victims: Fearing Crime and Making Law, in Governing
Through Crime, supra note 78, at 3-5 to 3-7. We become what cultural critic Lauren
Berlant calls "infantile citizens." LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO
WASHINGTON CITY: ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP 25 (1997). In this version of
citizenship, "a citizen is defined as a person traumatized by some aspect of life in the
United States. Portraits and stories of citizen-victims . . . now permeate the political public
sphere." Id. at 1.
94. His decision followed closely on the heels of an extraordinary series of hearings by
the Illinois Prison Review Board, hearings that were dominated by victims and their
family members. During these hearings, "hour after hour, victims and family members of
dead victims [were] forced to come before a panel and revisit the most horrific event in
their lives. These people had to retell their stories and beg, sobbing, for the panel to let
the current sentence of death stand." Katie Walsh, Clemency Hearings Unjust to Victims'
Families, COLUM. CHRON., Oct. 21, 2002, at 11, available at http://www.ccchronicle.com/
back/2002-10-21/opinions4.html. As Jennifer Culbert has said, in our era, "[t]he pain and
suffering expressed by the murder victim's survivors can serve as an absolute in a society
in which every other kind of claim is subject to contestation, doubt, and criticism."
Culbert, supra note 83, at 104.
95. Ryan, supra note 23.
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hometown. He now sits on death row. I also know his family. I
share this story with you so that you know I do not come to this
as a neophyte without having experienced a small bit of the
bitter pill the survivors of murder must swallow .... 96
This is a ghastly account, bringing before its listeners the specter
of a dead man, mercilessly slaughtered. That Ryan tied himself to
this ghost reminds us of Fitzpatrick's account of the finitude that
death imposes on law and the unfolding indeterminism of law's
beyond.97 Clemency exercised to stave off death, confronting it, as it
were, face-to-face and refusing its demand, helps to mark death as the
horizon of law both as "supreme stasis" and "the opening to all
possibility that is beyond affirmed order."98 Moreover, metaphors of
place, the small town, and the knowledge that Small was "there for
us," contribute to the ghostliness of Ryan's account precisely by
marking the placelessness of death and its irresistible ability to enter
any.
99
But there was another specter in this story, this one of a life
marked for its own untimely extinction. 10 By connecting himself to
Danny Edwards, Ryan rhetorically invoked the kind of dual
accountability that governs clemency in capital cases, one side facing
the already dead, the other those whose lives are in the balance. If
Ryan's rhetoric is rightly thought of as juridical, °' then, like others
who pass judgment in death penalty cases, he turned to "expressions
of pain as others may once have turned to God, in trust that this
96. Id.
97. Peter Fitzpatrick, Life, Death, and the Law-and Why Capital Punishment Is
Legally Insupportable, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 486-87 (1999).
98. Id. at 484.
99. The small town imagery is reminiscent of what Minow says about victim impact
statements:
[They] persuade, when they do, because they invoke widely shared images of
goodness, Christian piety.., the "little guy," and American patriotism, all of
which are talismans of the deserving person. Some degree of simplification is
inevitable and no one should be surprised to find that victim impact statements
do not reveal the uniqueness of the human being victimized by crime.
Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993).
100. One Italian scholar puts it this way:
With the death penalty-an act of sovereignty-the State, the Prince or the
Dictator claims an extraordinary power of calculation: the right to determine
when life expires. The President, the Governor, or the Judge, who hold the right
to grant pardon, the right to forgive and thus to make exceptions, are meant to
know and be able to calculate the time of death, the moment which abruptly puts
an end to the other's finitude.
Stefano Crosara, I'm Against the Death Penalty, TRIESTE CONTEMPORANEA, Nov. 2000,
http://www.tscont.ts.it/pag20-e.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
101. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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'sacred name' will make it possible for individuals to answer the
question, 'In the name of what or whom do we judge?' "102
Moreover, Ryan made his persona, his private not sovereign
body, vividly present. In this story he was caught, almost literally
torn, between the victim and the offender, reassuring his listeners that
he has tasted murder's "bitter pill." This was hardly the language of a
majestic, distant, undemocratic sovereignty, unresponsive to, or
uninterested in, the pain of the victims. It was, instead, the voice of a
real human being: a sovereign domesticated by that pain. For it was
only by assuming the status of a victim of Danny Edwards's crime
that he could be entitled to forgive it or to mitigate its punishment. 03
As the philosopher Jacques Derrida writes, pointing to the condition
that creates Ryan's dilemma:
Who would have the right of forgiving in the name of the
vanished victims? They are always absent, in a certain manner.
Missing in essence, they are never themselves absolutely
present, at the moment pardon is asked for .... 104
As victim and as someone in contact with the experience of
victimization, Ryan constituted his listeners as particular kinds of
political subjects, earning their attention, as it were, through his own
earnest attention to the claims of victims, even as he both broadened
and blurred the referent of the term:
05
As I came closer to my decision, I knew that I was going to
have to face the question of whether I believed so completely in
the choice I wanted to make that I could face the prospect of
even commuting the death sentence of Danny Edwards, the
man who had killed a close family friend of mine. I discussed it
102. Culbert, supra note 83, at 104-05 (quoting PHILLIPE LACOUE-LABARTHE,
HEIDEGGER, ART, AND POLITICS: THE FICTION OF THE POLITICAL, trans. Chris Turner
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), at 31) (source misquoted).
103. Only a victim, not a third party, should be allowed to grant forgiveness. See
Jacques Derrida, To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible 34 (undated)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Of course what
Ryan did was not really forgiveness in the strictest sense since most of his clemency
involved commutation, a kind of mercy, rather than pardon, which seems more closely
associated with forgiveness.
104. Jacques Derrida, The Century and the Pardon, LE MONDE DES DEBATS, Dec.
1999 (Greg Macon trans., 2001), http://www.excitingland.com/fixion/pardonEng.htm.
105. As Berlant notes, the result is to produce a "special form of tyranny that makes
citizens like children, infantilized, passive, and over dependent on the 'immense and
tutelary power' of the state." BERLANT, supra note 93, at 27 (quoting 2 ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 641 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop
eds & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835)).
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with my wife, Lura Lynn, who has stood by me all these years.
She was angry and disappointed at my decision like many of the
families of other victims will be.
10 6
There is a very interesting use of verb tenses here with Ryan
again describing himself as caught, this time between the past with its
own imagined future-"was going"-and the present, with its
anticipation of the coming anger and disappointment of the
community with which he is rhetorically allied. Danny Edwards
returned to the story, this time as the touchstone of Ryan's
accountability to his dead "close family friend." The test of his
commitment to clemency would be found in the answer to the
question of whether his beliefs and convictions could pass the Danny
Edwards test. Could he find the reasons to commute every death
sentence sufficiently persuasive to move him to spare even Edwards's
life? This was a stern test indeed, converting clemency into a
measure of personal conviction and strength for Ryan himself.
As if not able to say it enough times, Ryan repeatedly tried to
assure his listeners that he had indeed heard the voice of victims:
I have conducted private group meetings, one in Springfield
and one in Chicago, with the surviving family members of
homicide victims. Everyone in the room who wanted to speak
had the opportunity to do so. Some wanted to express their
grief, others wanted to express their anger. I took it all in.... I
redoubled my effort to review each case personally in order to
respond to the concerns of prosecutors and victims' families.107
Unlike the minimal due process that some Justices of the United
States Supreme Court believe must be provided for those seeking
clemency, 108 Ryan accorded a deep and respectful attentiveness to
victims. He took into himself their grief and anger, again rhetorically
refiguring himself as a victim. In Ryan's account there was a
106. Ryan, supra note 23.
107. Id.
108. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that "some minimal procedural safeguards apply to
clemency hearings." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, she did not specify what
those procedures might be. She could imagine judicial intervention only in cases of the
most transparent and unreasoning arbitrariness, as in "a scheme where a state official
flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State
arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens added to this list of barely imaginable horrors when he stated
that "no one would contend that a governor could ignore the commands of the Equal
Protection Clause and use race, religion, or political affiliation as a standard for granting
or denying clemency." Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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responsiveness to pain and a grounding not in sovereign grace, but in
the need to pay homage to suffering.109
Just as Ryan's rhetoric positioned him between victim and
offender and through him established connections between them, in
his expansive use of the category of "victim," he attempted to
establish connections between the relatives of those who had already
died and of those who were sentenced to death. Everyone, it turns
out, is in pain; the political community is imagined as constituted by
shared suffering.110
I also had a meeting with a group of people who are less often
heard from, and who are not as popular with the media. The
family members of death row inmates have a special challenge
to face. I spent an afternoon with those family members at a
Catholic Church here in Chicago. At that meeting, I heard a
different kind of pain expressed. Many of these families live
with the twin pain of knowing not only that, in some cases, their
family member may have been responsible for inflicting a
terrible trauma on another family, but also the pain of knowing
that society has called for another killing. These parents,
siblings and children are not to blame for the crime committed,
yet these innocent stand to have their loved ones killed by the
state.... They are also branded and scarred for life because of
the awful crime committed by their family member. Others
were even more tormented by the fact that their loved one was
another victim, that they were truly innocent of the crime for
which they were sentenced to die."'
Again Ryan deployed his own kind of due process. He was the
sovereign holding court to receive the petition of his subjects, but in a
church instead of a castle. He was listening, hearing, heeding the
voice of another group figuratively silenced by their connection to
death, the death of those whose time of death had been made
calculable by society's choice. And again it was pain that provides the
connective tissue between speakers and listeners.
Yet what can victims provide for those with the power of
clemency? They are present in every clemency decision, whether it is
granted or refused, but despite Ryan's rhetorical identification with
109. "In the absence of an overarching principle or absolute to which to refer for sense
and guidance in a multicultural, morally pluralist society, the survivor is embraced as a
unique figure with the power to liberate people from the chains of a well-meaning but
paralyzing relativism." Culbert, supra note 83, at 134.
110. Culbert contends that it is "counter-intuitive to think of a subjective experience
like pain as establishing a publicly valid authority." Id.
111. Ryan, supra note 23.
1368 [Vol. 82
GEORGE RYAN'S CLEMENCY
them, the judgment, and responsibility for it, could only be his.
Despite his identification with victims, he could not, as the reactions
of Cathy Drobney and John Woodhouse suggest, 112 dispense
forgiveness in their name. Despite the connections he tried to forge
in a community with many different kinds of victims, stable grounds
for his act could not be established in its shared pain. So, he turned
from responsiveness to suffering in a community of victims to a
critique of the institutions of the legal and political system for being
insufficiently attentive to the claims of retributive justice.
B. Clemency and the Requirements of Justice
As Ryan changed the subject, he used victims and their needs to
introduce his broad indictment of Illinois's death penalty system.
Victims of heinous crimes, it turns out, are also victimized by the
capital punishment system. Speaking of the relative rarity of capital
punishment, he cited the statistic that less than two percent of the
more than one thousand murder defendants in Illinois would receive
the death penalty. Ryan further sympathized with the victims'
families, who would not have the opportunity to derive satisfaction
from a sentence of death."3
Ryan's guarded language registers his uncertainty about what
executions do for victims' families, and his doubt that they provide
their much advertised virtue of closure."4 Imagining the crime
victim's family as the paradigmatic needy citizen, Ryan asked, "What
kind of victims' services are we providing? Are all of our resources
geared toward providing this notion of closure by execution instead of
tending to the physical and social service needs of victim families?"
But Ryan's rhetorical identification with victims was overridden
in his "I Must Act" statement by a commitment to ensuring that
offenders get what they deserve. Retribution provided a disciplining
112. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
113. Ryan, supra note 23.
114. "To a family they talked about closure," Ryan says. "They pleaded with me to
allow the state to kill an inmate in its name to provide the families with closure. But is
that the purpose of capital punishment? Is it to soothe the families? And is that truly
what the families experience?" Id. In Kaminer's view, talk about closure
partakes of the popular confusion of law and therapy and the substitution of
feelings for facts. But if feelings are facts in a therapist's office ... feelings are
prejudices in a court of law .... Justice is not a form of therapy, meaning that
what is helpful to a particular victim ... is not necessarily just and what is just
may not be therapeutic.
KAMINER, supra note 56, at 84.
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presence in his exercise of clemency," 5 an anchor of lawfulness in the
presence of his potentially uncheckable power." 6 Kobil describes
Ryan's statement thus:
Governor Ryan relied entirely on retributive arguments....
Although there has been substantial public outcry against
Ryan's actions and even legal challenges to some of his
commutations, it appears that for now retributive justifications
have carried the day.... Ultimately... Governor George
Ryan was persuaded to grant clemency to every person on
Death Row not as a grand gesture of forgiveness, but because
his faith in the ability of the Illinois system to give only
deserving defendants a sentence of death had been destroyed
by a series of blatant errors and mistakes." 7
Ryan's commitment to a just deserts theory of punishment
moved him from individual cases, on which clemency typically
focuses, to the systemic level. Ryan observed,
The facts I have seen in reviewing each and every one of these
cases, raised questions not only about the innocence of people
on death row, but about the fairness of the death penalty
system as a whole. If the system was making so many errors in
determining whether someone was guilty in the first place, how
fairly and accurately was it determining which guilty defendants
deserved to live and which deserved to die? What effect was
race having? What effect was poverty having?"1
8
Ryan inverted the logic of the Supreme Court's decision in
McCleskey v. Kemp"9 in this rhetorical movement from the individual
to the system and in his reference to the effect of race in the system of
state killing. Presented with a wholesale challenge to Georgia's death
penalty system, the Court refused to inquire into systemic problems
that might undermine confidence in decisions at the "heart of the
criminal justice system." ' Unlike the Court, which refused to move
115. Kobil, supra note 84, at 227-28.
116. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). Speaking of the President's power
to pardon, the Court gave legal sanction to its lawlessness. Writing for the majority,
Justice Field observed that the power to pardon is virtually unlimited, as it includes any
offense and can be exercised at any time. The power is also not subject to Congressional
limits. Id; see also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925) (stating that the
President's power to grant pardons is absolute, rather than strictly limited to federal
offenses).
117. Kobil, supra note 84, at 227-28, 240.
118. Ryan, supra note 23.
119. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
120. Id. at 314 n.37 (stating that by basing their dissent on a statistical study that
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from the particular to the general,121 it is exactly this inquiry upon
which Ryan insisted:
The death penalty has been abolished in 12 states. In none of
these states has the homicide rate increased. In Illinois last year
we had about 1000 murders, only 2 percent of that 1000 were
sentenced to death.[sic] Where is the fairness and equality in
that? The death penalty in Illinois is not imposed fairly or
uniformly because of the absence of standards for the 102
Illinois State Attorneys, who must decide whether to request
the death sentence. Should geography be a factor in
determining who gets the death sentence? I don't think so but
in Illinois it makes a difference. You are 5 times more likely to
get a death sentence for first degree murder in the rural area of
Illinois than you are in Cook County. Where is the justice and
fairness in that? Where is the proportionality?
122
Instead of a system finely geared to assigning punishment on the
basis of a careful assessment of the nature of the crime and the
blameworthiness of the offender, Ryan, quoting Justice Blackmun,
concluded that "'the death penalty remains fraught with
arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice and mistake.' ",123 Here he
assumed the posture of a "new abolitionist. 1 24 The new abolitionist
does not oppose state killing as an affront to morality or as per se
unconstitutional. Instead, he argues against the death penalty in the
name of constitutional rights other than the Eighth Amendment-in
particular due process and equal protection. New abolitionists, like
Ryan, argue against the death penalty, claiming that it has not been,
and cannot be, administered in a manner that is compatible with our
legal system's fundamental commitments to fair and equal treatment.
Thus, Ryan noted that:
[P]rosecutors in Illinois have the ultimate commutation power,
a power that is exercised every day. They decide who will be
subject to the death penalty, who will get a plea deal or even
purports to show a disparity in imposition of the Georgia death penalty sentences due to
the victim's race, the dissenting Justices would eliminate the traditional discretion that
prosecutors and juries necessarily must have).
121. For a useful analysis of the implications of this refusal for our understanding of
narrative and rhetoric, see Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Subversive Stories, Hegemonic
Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 197,215-16 (1995).
122. Ryan, supra note 23.
123. Id. (quoting Collins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
124. AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN CONDITION 246-60 (2001).
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who may get a complete pass on prosecution. By what
objective standards do they make these decisions? We do not
know, they are not public .... [I]f you look at the cases, as I
have done both individually and collectively-a killing with the
same circumstances might get 40 years in one county and death
in another county. I have also seen where co-defendants who
are equally or even more culpable get sentenced to a term of
years, while another less culpable defendant ends up on death
row.... Our capital system is haunted by the demon of error,
error in determining guilt, and error in determining who among
the guilty deserves to die.125
Ryan issued a stunning, though by now familiar, indictment of a
system in which decisions about who gets the death penalty and who
does not are made without reference to "objective standards." He
drew attention to the contrast between his own publicly delivered
justification and the daily "commutation" decisions of prosecutors,
made without explanation, outside of the public eye. Ryan found
arbitrariness deeply enfolded within the operations of the death
penalty system, pointing to the influence of irrelevant factors like
geography and to the fact that offenders committing the same acts
end up with radically different sentences. In a system marked by such
arbitrariness, perhaps only the arbitrary power of clemency could
provide a route to justice.
Ryan invoked yet another calculus of desert to justify his
commutation, returning Danny Edwards to the center of the story:
Some inmates on death row don't want a sentence of life
without parole. Danny Edwards wrote me and told me not to
do him any favors because he didn't want to face a prospect of a
life in prison without parole. They will be confined in a cell that
is about 5-feet-by-12 feet, usually double-bunked. Our prisons
have no air conditioning, except at our supermax facility where
inmates are kept in their cell 23 hours a day. In summer
months, temperatures in these prisons exceed one hundred
degrees. It is a stark and dreary existence. They can think
about their crimes. Life without parole has even, at times, been
described by prosecutors as a fate worse than death.126
Ryan told his listeners of Edwards's preference not to be spared.
He did so in order to assure them that his commutation decision
actually satisfied the requirements of justice better than would capital




punishment. He described a future spent in thinking about one's
worst deed, a kind of living self-torture, as a "fate worse than death,"
and in doing so again called attention to his own future suffering:
I realize it will draw ridicule, scorn and anger from many who
oppose this decision. They will say I am usurping the decisions
of judges and juries and state legislators.... I may never be
comfortable with my final decision, but I will know in my heart,
that I did my very best to do the right thing.
12 7
From responsiveness to the claims of suffering and of death itself,
Ryan sought grounding in a retributive calculus.'28 Yet, as Ryan's
discussion of Danny Edwards's views on life-without-parole
highlighted, retributivism could not ensure stable grounds for
judgment any more than could his complicated imaginings of the
victims and their needs.'29 It could not alleviate the need to take
responsibility for his decision. It is that decision, along with the
power to actualize it, that defines the essence of clemency whether in
monarchical or democratic governments:
My responsibilities and obligations are more than my neighbors
and my family. I represent all the people of Illinois, like it or
not. The people of our state have vested in me the power to act
in the interest of justice. Even if the exercise of my power
becomes my burden I will bear it.... "I know," he said, "that
my decision will be just that-my decision."'130
Saying that he "never intended to be an activist" on the death
penalty,' Ryan portrayed himself as someone who was propelled
against his own inclination to do a painful and costly duty that others,
in particular the courts and the legislature, refused to do. 32  The
127. Id.
128. Kobil, supra note 84, at 227.
129. See R.A. DUFF & DAVID GARLAND, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment,
in A READER ON PUNISHMENT at 1, 7 (1995) ("[T]he notion of 'desert' is supposed to
indicate the justificatory link between past crime and present punishment. But just what is
that link? What is 'desert' which supposedly makes punishment the appropriate response
to crime?").
130. Ryan, supra note 23.
131. Id.
132. Here, Ryan's critique was not directed at the system through which the death
penalty was administered. Instead, his critique turned from a retributivist's indictment of
the flaws in that system to a criticism of the failures of the political system-failures in the
absence of which clemency would have been unnecessary.
Turning first to the Illinois State Supreme Court, Ryan portrayed it as "divided"
on issues which he saw as clear cut and as failing in courage on the ultimate question of the
constitutionality of capital 'punishment itself. Ryan reported:
We have come very close to having our state Supreme Court rule our death
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legislature's failure to take responsibility was not its failure alone. It
was, on Ryan's account, "a symptom of the larger problem" in the
domain of state killing:
It is easier and more comfortable for politicians to be tough on
crime and support the death penalty. It wins votes. But when it
comes to admitting that we have a problem, most run for cover.
We are a rudderless ship because [these politicians] failed to
act.
133
Seizing that rudder is today, as it long has been, one of the
imperatives of executive leadership in times of crisis. Saying that
"[t]he legislature couldn't reform it. Lawmakers won't repeal it. But
I will not stand for it. I must act," 1" Ryan plunged into that lawful
lawlessness that today marks the exercise of sovereign prerogative, as
it always has. 35
penalty statute-the one that I helped enact in 1977-unconstitutional. Former
State Supreme Court Justice Seymour Simon wrote to me that it was only
happenstance that our statute was not struck down by the state's high court.
When he joined the bench in 1980, three other justices had already said Illinois'
death penalty was unconstitutional. But they got cold feet when a case came
along to revisit the question. One judge wrote that he wanted to wait and see if
the Supreme Court of the United States would rule on the constitutionality of the
new Illinois law. Another said precedent required him to follow the old state
Supreme Court ruling with which he disagreed. Even a pharmacist knows that
doesn't make sense. We wouldn't have a death penalty today, and we all
wouldn't be struggling with this issue, if those votes had been different. How
arbitrary.
Id.
But his strongest criticism was directed toward the state legislature of which he was once a
member:
I have also had to watch in frustration as members of the Illinois General
Assembly failed to pass even one substantive death penalty reform. Not one.
They couldn't even agree on ONE. How much more evidence is needed before
the General Assembly will take its responsibility in this area seriously? . .. I
don't know why legislators could not heed the rising voices of reform. I don't
know how many more systemic flaws we needed to uncover before they would be
spurred to action. Three times I proposed reforming the system with a package
that would restrict the use of jailhouse snitches, create a statewide panel to
determine death eligible cases, and reduce the number of crimes eligible for
death. These reforms would not have created a perfect system, but they would





135. Derrida refers to the clemency power as what he calls "the right of grace." To
speak of such a right, he says, is to locate clemency on the terrain of law, that is to place it
within the "order of rights." Yet this right works precisely by inscribing in law "a power
above the law." Clemency, he says, is "[l]aw above the law." Derrida, supra note 104.
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CONCLUSION
George Ryan's clemency was an enormously significant moment
in our national debate about capital punishment, if for no other
reason than that it energized those seeking to end state killing. For
example, a spokesperson for Amnesty International said Ryan's
decision marked a "significant step in the struggle against the death
penalty" and urged governors of states still implementing the death
penalty to follow suit.'36 Or, as former Senator Paul Simon put it,
"Governor Ryan has moved this nation in the direction of the other
world democracies. The U.S. has been alone in the world in its use of
the death penalty."' 37
Yet, the justifications that Ryan offered for his decision were
contradictory and somewhat incoherent, symptomatic of the power
and appeal of the victims' rights movement and of the continuing
attraction of retribution as a basis for punishment. Ryan did not and
could not make the pieces fit. His identification with victims pushed
him toward an emotional embrace of their pain and suffering as the
standard for determining just punishment. Yet his critique of the
arbitrariness and politicization of the death penalty system pushed
him toward the kind of reasoned, impersonal judgment that distances
itself from the pain and suffering of victims.
If philosophers cannot reconcile retributive justice and the
desires of victims, it should not be surprising that George Ryan failed
in this same endeavor. Despite his inability to put a square peg in a
round hole, however, Ryan's act was well within the bounds of
traditional understandings of clemency. Its forebears are Clinton,
Bush, and Rehnquist. Far from disrupting the essential rhythms of
American politics, in its emphasis on suffering and victimization, and
in its embrace of retributive principles, in its demonstration of
"energy in the executive' 13 8 yet modest view that clemency is only
appropriate to correct errors in the judicial process, Ryan gave new
voice to ongoing trends in our political and cultural lives.
State Senator Haine may have been right to characterize it as "a
great wrong [and] ... an extraordinary and.. .breathtaking act of
arrogance" and to say that it broke the bond of trust between the
136. Dominic Evans, Amnesty Urges Bush "Moral Stand" on Death Penalty, at
http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/coverage/48.html (Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
137. O'Brien, supra note 6.
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, AT 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) ("Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government.").
2004] 1375
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
people and the Governor, but he was surely wrong when he alleged
that Ryan's clemency rendered the law meaningless.139 And, if Ryan's
pardon was an "injury to law itself," it is an injury that the law
authorizes and requires, a form of lawful lawlessness without which
the law would indeed be rendered meaningless. 140 While his critics
may have misread and misunderstood Ryan's use of clemency, failing
to see that its essential incoherence arose from his effort to be
sensitive to victims and also responsive to the dictates of justice, they
may have been onto something important in highlighting the lawful
lawlessness that is endemic to clemency itself. Despite Ryan's gallant
efforts to ground and authorize his acts in the suffering of victims and
the systemic flaws of the capital punishment system, he could neither
resolve the contradictory forces that mark our contemporary political
condition nor satisfy our need for, and yet discomfort with, the
sovereign power to spare life.
139. Whitworth, supra note 12; see supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
140. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 18
(Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998). Acts of clemency create exceptions, exclusions, but
as Agamben notes, the exception does not "subtract itself from the rule; rather the rule,
suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the
exception, first constitutes itself as a rule." Id.
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